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Uprooting Identities:
The Regulation of Olive Trees in the Occupied West Bank
It is as though, by virtue of the derealization of Palestine, a project reaching back
over 50 years, the roots of Palestinian violence – the dispossession of the
Palestinian people, the dispersal of refugees, and the horrors of military
occupation – have been torn up with their olive groves. [Gregory 2003:319]
Like children, their trees look so naïve, as if they can’t harm anyone. But like
[their] children, several years later they turn into a ticking bomb. [Interview,
Chief Inspector Kishik, Israel’s Civil Administration, Beit El military base,
September 7, 2006]
Trees in general, and olive and pine trees in particular, perform a pivotal role in both the
Zionist and the Palestinian national narratives. Since 1901, the Jewish National Fund
(JNF), an organization established by the Fifth Zionist Congress for purchasing land in
biblical Israel, has planted over 240 million trees in Israel, most of which are pines. This
massive enterprise has fundamentally transformed the Israeli/Palestinian landscape.
Indeed, over the years, the pine has come to be perceived as the quintessential symbol of
the Zionist project: through its rooting, the land of Israel has transformed into a
European-looking landscape (Bardenstein 1999; Braverman 2009, in press.a; Cohen
1993; Long 2005; Zerubavel 1995).
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Figure 1. Palestinian woman lamenting the vandalization of her olive trees in
Litwane, January 6, 2006, near the Jewish settlement of Ma’on. Source: REUTERS/Nayef
Hashlamoun, 2006. Reprinted with permission.

If the Jewish tree is the pine, the Palestinian tree is the olive (see, e.g., Figures 1 & 2). As
Ismat Shbeta, a refugee from the depopulated Palestinian village Miske, tells me in an
interview, “The olive is the Palestinian tree…. That’s the olive’s nationality” (Interview,
Tel Aviv, August 10, 2006). The olive and the pine seem to be perfect opposites,
agronomically as well as culturally. Elsewhere, I have explored in depth both the pine’s
construction as the Zionist tree and the bifurcated relation between the pine and the olive,
along with the range of contestations to this naturalized bifurcation (2009, in press.a, in
press.b).
This article’s focus is on the olive tree. Again, this is but one side of the much larger
story of the tree wars performed in this region. The article studies the olive’s various
meanings within Palestinian culture as well as its targeting by the State of Israel and by
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certain Jewish settlers. I argue here that the identity of the olive as a representation of the
Palestinian is not only the result of its economic, cultural, and historical significance
within this particular culture, but is increasingly a product of the olive’s brutal targeting
by the State of Israel and by certain Jewish Israeli settlers. Through their direct and
indirect acts of uprooting, sabotaging, and denying the Palestinians access to the olive
tree, the State of Israel and the settlers have vested the olive with enormous power. At the
end of the day, then, the various struggles conducted on the olive’s behalf have enhanced
the already significant status of the olive tree in various Palestinian narratives. The tragic
story constructed around the olive has made this tree, more than ever before, into both the
symbol and the embodiment of Palestinian nationhood--and, perhaps more importantly,
into a manifestation of Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation.
At the same time, the article also demonstrates how humanitarian initiatives enacted by
the State of Israel to protect Palestinian olive cultivation have led to an even tighter, yet
also more discrete, system of surveillance of Palestinians in the West Bank. The system is
enforced through close monitoring by Israel’s Defense Forces of the Palestinians’
concept of space and time, mainly through the newly established regime of “friction
zones” and “timetables.” The tight security administration imposed through the
regulation of the Palestinians’ olive-related practices has thus taken over their everyday
relationship with their land. The project of Palestinian resistance through rooting olives
into the land has, in other words, been flipped on its head and has morphed into yet
another means for Israel’s assertion of occupation and control in this place.
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Generally, this article is situated within the literature of Law and Geography, which
focuses on an exploration of the intricate connections between law and space (see, e.g.,
Blomley 1994; Blomley et. al 2001; Delaney 1998). My study offers a more material
focus within this literature. It highlights both the physical and the imaginary spatialities
of olive trees. It also demonstrates how the identity of these trees and the establishment of
their meaning have manifested and changed through a set of government policies, court
decisions, and military regulations.

Figure 2. Olive trees (foreground) and pines (background) in the northern West
Bank. Photo by author, August 2006.

The article begins by describing the significance of the olive for the Palestinian, which
ranges between its identity as a shajara fakir (pauper’s tree) and its identity as a shajara
mubaraka (holy tree). This part of the article focuses on the Palestinian act of “rooting,”
and even clinging, to the land, performed through the olive tree. Thus the olive here not
merely stands for but also embodies the Palestinian. Next, the article focuses on the
olive’s “uprooting.” Specifically, it explores two instances of olive uprooting: the State of
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Israel’s massive uprooting of olive orchards in order to make way for the Separation
Barrier and the publicly contested uprooting and sabotaging of olive trees by certain
Jewish settlers. In both instances, the olive’s erasure from the landscape is perceived as
necessary to make space for an alternative and exclusive Jewish presence. Parallel to the
olive’s direct obstruction through uprooting, the final section of the article identifies
another, much less direct, form of control of the Palestinian’s relationship with the olive-this time through Israel’s enactment of a diffuse regulatory network of “friction zones”
and “timetables.”
The article is based on a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews and also on
participant observation with the following: Palestinian fellahin (Arabic for farmers; see
also Swedenburg 1990); members of a radical group of Jewish Israeli settlers; officials in
Israel’s Military Administration of the West Bank – which since 1981 also includes
Israel’s Civil Administration; and members of human rights organizations such as Rabbis
for Human Rights, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, B’Tselem, and Yesh Din.
The interviews and observations were conducted during the winter of 2005, the summer
of 2006, and the spring of 2008.
Between Shajara Fakir (Pauper’s Tree) Shajara Mubaraka (Holy Tree)
A. The olive industry is considered one of the most important agricultural
vegetations in the area of Judea and Samaria, and a central source of living
for most of the villages in this area; …
C. The olive harvest is a socio-economic event in Palestinian society, and
the days of harvest are considered a holiday in which the entire family
engages.
Although these words could be taken from a book discussing Palestinian culture, they are
actually from a leaflet produced by Israel’s Civil Administration for Judea and Samaria
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that was distributed widely among soldiers of Israel’s Defense Forces deployed in the
occupied West Bank during the harvest season of 2005. This section explores how such
an unexpected source of information about Palestinian harvest culture came to be.

Figure 3. Olive groves in the occupied West Bank. Photo by author, August 2006.

Approximately 45 percent of arable land in the occupied Palestinian territories (including
the Gaza Strip) is planted with olive trees.1 Most of the olive groves are located in the
West Bank, where the olive industry accounts for approximately 40 percent of the total
value of agricultural produce and for 70 percent of the production from fruit trees. More
than 70,500 farmers own olive trees, and many more depend upon various activities
associated with the trees for their livelihood. Some 90 percent of the olive crop is
designated for oil, which is processed in 194 olive presses situated throughout the
occupied Palestinian territories. The size of the olive harvest varies from year to year, but
usually corresponds with a biennial cycle, characterized by a high yield in one year and a
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low one in the next. Most olive-related activities occur during a two-month period in the
fall, which is also known as the olive harvest season.
The importance of the agricultural sector at large and of the olive industry in particular in
Palestinian society has increased significantly since the beginning of the second Intifada
in 2000. Before this time, many rural residents of the occupied West Bank were
employed in Israel. But Israel’s severe restrictions on movement since the second Intifada
have caused many to lose their jobs. The increase in unemployment – now more than 50
percent of the workforce – has gradually increased the number of Palestinians whose
livelihoods depend on local sources of income, and chiefly on their ability to complete
the economic cycles of olive oil production: harvesting the olive fruit, extracting the oil,
and selling it. As recorded by the human rights organization B’Tselem on October 3,
2002, Muhammad Ubeid’s testimony demonstrates the economic importance of the olive
industry:
When I became unemployed, olive picking turned into the principal source of
income for others in my family and me. During last year’s harvest, my brothers
and I picked olives even though there weren’t many on the trees…. This year, the
olives are plentiful, so we expect a large harvest. All the village residents are
relying upon this season’s harvest, because unemployment has been rampant in
the village. So olive picking has become almost our sole source of income.
[Testimony, B’Tselem 2002]2
Similarly, several Palestinians interviewed for this study refer to the olive tree as Shajara
el-Fakir, or “the pauper’s tree”: “you don’t give it anything and it gives you everything in
return,” they say (Interview, Rashid in Yanun village, August 21, 2006). But as Rabbi
Ascherman, executive director of Rabbis for Human Rights, explains, the significance of
the olive to the Palestinian goes far beyond economics:
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In recent years [the olive] has an increasing cultural and symbolical importance and
is less an economic thing. It’s about the ties to the land and the entire family going
out and harvesting together…. Sometimes people don’t care that much about their
olives, [and] it’s just a way to show their connection to their land. [Telephone
interview, December 23, 2008]
Indeed, Rabbi Ascherman stresses that Palestinians have been using the olive trees to
strengthen their territorial claims. Such claims are frequently grounded in the principle of
sumud. Sumud, meaning steadfastness or steadfast perseverance, is a political strategy of
resistance that first emerged among Palestinians through the experience of the occupation
in the wake of the 1967 war (Nassar and Heacock 1990: 28). Accordingly, Nabil, a fallah
(farmer) from Akraba, tells me, “The olives are my life. [They are] my soul. My olives
are like my children.” This form of intense identification is a necessary stage in
constructing the interchangeability between the material olive tree and the body of the
Palestinian.
Later that day, I ask a large group of Palestinian farmers why the olive tree is so
important to them. Two of the farmers – Rashid from Yanun and Zakaria from Jit –
explain that the Quran regards the olive as one of two trees blessed by Allah (the other is
the fig). This, they say, makes the olive a shajara mubaraka: a holy tree. But the farmers
all agree that the olive tree is not important only in itself. Nabil explains that “it’s the
land. The land is the most important thing… I will never give it up. El ard, we’el ard
wahid (the land, and the land only)” (Interview, Akraba village, August 21, 2006). This
statement explicates the project of resistance embodied in the Palestinian act of
cultivating the olives: more than anything, the olive has thus become an act of steadfast
resistance to the Israeli occupation.
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Figure 4. Nabil, a Palestinian farmer, near his olive grove in the occupied West Bank.
Photo by author, August 2006.

A similar notion is aptly phrased in a completely different context by David Kishik, Chief
Inspector in Israel’s Civil Administration of the occupied West Bank, who tells me that,
“The olive tree is one of the best ownership techniques around.” The olive’s uniqueness,
Inspector Kishik further explains, is based on its cultural and economic significance and
is tied to its particular physical features (Interview, Beit El military base, September 7,
2006). Suliman Shahin, a Palestinian lawyer who has represented numerous Palestinians
in a variety of land claims against Israel, says more about the physical features of olive
cultivation:
What does it mean to cultivate an olive tree? You don’t need to do much to
cultivate an olive tree, you need to come in September and prune, and then three
months later to harvest…. Other trees need a much more serious presence…. Such
a [military] system does not allow growing anything else but olive trees. It’s a
catch-22, you see: we have many cases where people can’t access their land, so
what will they grow on it but olive trees? The olive is the only tree that can
survive on its own, and it is also the Palestinian’s agricultural symbol par
excellence. It has become this way. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 23, 2005;
emphasis added]

9

Indeed, the Palestinians interviewed here stress that, more than any other tree or animal,
the olive tree has come to symbolize the Palestinian people and their quest for
independence. This is aided by the olive’s particular physical features. The olive’s
steadfastness, durability, and extraordinary longevity (some say that olive trees can
survive for thousands of years) have become symbols of the Palestinian struggle against
the Israeli occupation and for national independence.
However, Zionist narratives refer to the olive’s same steadfastness and durability as
indicators of the unproductive nature of its Palestinian cultivators and, in particular, as
illustrative of the Palestinian’s unsuitability for engaging in more sophisticated forms of
cultivation. This notion is described and criticized by Michael Sfard, a Jewish Israeli
lawyer who has represented several Palestinians in petitions against Israel’s Separation
Barrier:
[Zionists have] a certain fixation that the Palestinians have only a very
superficial relationship with their land: they come only once a year and
then leave. This blends in well with the stereotype of the lazy Arab that
sits under the tree all day: the goats come to him and give him their milk,
and the olives, when they don’t fall on his head, he might need to shake
the tree lightly so that they fall in his lap…. You see this in the Zionist
discourse for over a hundred years: they [the Palestinians] are portrayed as
lazy people. This very superficial perspective creates a huge cultural
misunderstanding about the Palestinians’ relationship to their land.
[Interview, Jerusalem, August 9, 2006]
Sfard’s account provides a clear, if somewhat cynical and overstated, description of the
stereotypical Zionist perception of the Palestinian farmer. To this he adds that, for
Palestinian culture,
land is not only a source of livelihood. It is not only a factory for food.
Land is a part of the identity of the people. The seasons, the holidays – are
all dependent upon things that bear a connection to the land. And when
you prevent these people from harvesting, it’s like putting them under
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house arrest: you’re preventing them from doing something that is part of
their cultural world. Land is part of their identity. [Interview, Jerusalem,
August 9, 2006]
Sfard’s account may help explain why, for the Palestinian, the olive has become such a
patriotic emblem, imbued with so much nostalgia and yearning.
Palestinian art frequently reflects the olive’s nationalistic dimensions. Several Palestinian
poets in particular have placed the olive at the forefront of grassroots resistance to the
Israeli occupation, calling this “resistance poetry” (Harlow 1987: 70; see also Kanafani
1958). The following three excerpts are from Palestinian poems that relate to the olive
tree as a vehicle of Palestinian nationalism and resistance:
The sun reproached us
It came, as usual,
Asking us to be patient
To remain like olive branches –
Deep in the soil
Are the roots of the olive tree –
To remain
Like the roots of the olive tree.
[As’ad al-As’ad, in Ashrawi 1978: 91]
Lightning, thunder, prayer
Hurricane, storms,
And floods break the branches
Of trees.
Ropes of earthworm
Trim the leaves of youthful olive trees
But the roots of the olive
Return and stretch in the depth
Of the soil…
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Roots of olive, you have become the model
And man is competing, imitating your root,
Olive of the land.
[Mahmoud Awad Abbas, in Ashrawi 1978: 91]
I shall carve the record of all my sufferings, and all my secrets,
On an olive tree, in the courtyard, of the house…,
I shall carve the number of each deed of our usurped land.
The demolished houses of its people, my uprooted trees, …
And to remember it all,
I shall continue to carve all the chapters of my tragedy,
and all the stages of the disaster, from beginning to end,
On the olive tree, in the courtyard, of the house.
[Tawfiq Zayyad, in Bardenstein 1998: 28]
Even more tragic is Casualty 18 by late Mahmoud Darwish. This poem marks the 1956
massacre of fifty Palestinians from the Israeli Palestinian village of Kfar Kassem during
Israel’s military rule over areas with a large Arab Israeli population between 1949 and
1966. Not realizing that the Israeli army had changed the curfew by several hours, the
workers returned home from work outside the village and were all shot and killed on
sight. The poem is written from the perspective of one of the dead men, whose wedding
was to take place several days later. In the poem he addresses his bride:
The olive grove was once green,
At least it used to be…and the sky
was a blue forest…at least it used to be, my love
What changed it that evening?
The olive grove was always green.
At least it used to be, my love.
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Fifty victims, at sundown
Turned it into a red pool…fifty victims.
[Mahmoud Darwish, in Bardenstein 1999: 153–154]
Of the large body of Palestinian poetry that uses the olive tree as a symbol of the
Palestinian struggle, these four poems illustrate the idea of the olive tree as a living
memory of the Palestinian village and its people and as a silent witness of their suffering
(Bardenstein 1998: 28). The olive is depicted as growing where drops of Palestinian
blood have been spilled, standing for the Palestinian by bearing witness for what has been
erased and is no longer there. Numerous other Palestinian accounts refer to the olive as an
embodiment of the Palestinian’s absent condition (see, e.g., Farah 1963). In this very
literal sense, the olive, still firmly rooted in the land from which its planter was uprooted,
re-presents the Palestinian.
The olive tree, among other orchard trees, also figures prominently in Palestinian
attempts to construct memory maps of villages that were depopulated and destroyed
during the 1948 and 1967 wars. Although most of the houses in these villages were
demolished, the trees and vegetation sometimes survived. In these circumstances, the
trees have served as an anchoring device (van der Sluijs et. al 1998) for the exiles who
visit these places seeking signs of their families’ previous life there (Bardenstein 1999:
157; Slyomovics 1998).
A fusion of humans and trees is thereby constructed: the olive embodies the Palestinian
people, the green of its foliage is perceived as interchangeable with the red of their blood.
However, the olive is not only a proxy witness (Bardenstein 1999: 156); it also provides a
model of survival for the Palestinian people. In this sense, the olive not only stands for
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but also speaks for the mute and uprooted Palestinian (contrary to the more usual case
whereby humans speak for things; see, e.g., Callon 1986).

Figure 5. Suspended in space: the uprooting of olive trees for the expansion of
Zufin, a Jewish settlement in the Tulkarm district. Source: B’Tselem; photo courtesy of
Christoph Gocke – EAPPI. Reprinted with permission.

Olive Uprooting: The Wall against the Olive
Up until now I have explored the powerful meanings of olive uprooting to Palestinians
and its significance in the project of resisting the Israeli occupation, which is also heavily
focused on territory and land (Weizman 2007). Now, I would like to explore Israel’s
project of uprooting this same tree, an act that can only be understood in light of the
previous discussion.
Since its inception, and increasingly in the last two decades, Israel has been uprooting
Palestinian olive trees. The use of tree uprooting as a punitive measure predates the
establishment of the State of Israel; it was used by Ottoman rulers against the fellahin as
punishment for tax avoidance and was later implemented by the British Mandatory
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administration in Palestine through its emergency regulations (Cohen 1993; Bardenstein
1998: 10). However, Israel’s central rationale for uprooting olive trees in the occupied
territories has not been framed as punitive, or at least not explicitly so. Israel explains
these uprootings, rather, as essential for its national security. First, Israel has been
uprooting olives to make way for the recently built Separation Barrier. In the same vein,
Israel’s Defense Forces have uprooted thousands of olive and other fruit trees, and
continues to do so, to secure roads, increase visibility, and make way for watchtowers,
checkpoints, additional roads, and security fences around Jewish settlements (see, e.g.,
Figure 5 as well as Ha’aretz 2006c).
However, the form of olive uprooting that has probably received the most local and
international attention is that performed in the occupied West Bank not by the Israeli
government but by certain Jewish Israeli settlers. At least on the face of things, this form
of uprooting is against the official Israeli policy. I focus this section on the practice of
olive uprooting that has taken the largest quantitative toll: that conducted in the process
of Israel’s construction of the Separation Barrier. The next section explores uprooting by
settlers.
In 2002, the State of Israel began the project of constructing the Separation Barrier
through the entire West Bank to separate Jewish settlements and Israeli cities from
Palestinian towns and villages (Weizman 2007: 161). Completed in August 2003, the first
section of the Separation Barrier stretches over 125 kilometers (80 miles) and consists of
an electrified fence with roads, trenches, and barbed-wire fences on each side. The
barrier’s width (which includes the roads, trenches, and barbed-wire fences) ranges
between 50 and 100 meters. Along eight kilometers of this section of the barrier, Israel
15

has also built an eight-meter-high concrete wall. Finally, some 80 percent of this section
is located east of the Green Line (the internationally recognized border), thereby isolating
Palestinian villages and agricultural areas from the rest of the West Bank (cited in
B’Tselem 2004).
After a series of re-routings, the current route of the barrier was approved by the Israeli
government in April 2006. According to this 723 kilometer-long route, 8.5 percent of the
West Bank territory and 27,520 Palestinians are on the “Israeli” side of the barrier.
Another 3.4 percent of the area (with 247,800 inhabitants) is completely or partially
surrounded by the barrier.3
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Tens of thousands of olive trees have been uprooted to make way for the Separation
Barrier (Telegraph 2002). In the village of Qafeen alone, for example, 12,600 olive trees
were uprooted for this purpose. An additional 100,000 olive trees situated on lands
owned by Palestinians from this same village were trapped behind the barrier in what
have been defined as “seam zones.” Their owners are prohibited from accessing them
most of the year, so that “[a]ll they can do is gaze on the neglect from afar” (Ha’aretz
2006c).
Although the uprooting of olive trees to facilitate the construction of the Separation
Barrier initially caused some unease among the Israeli public, soon the security rationale
supporting the barrier prevailed. However, under international pressure, the Israeli
government assured that it would re-plant all uprooted olives. Suliman Shahin, the
Palestinian attorney discussed above, addresses the assumption behind this re-planting:
[Since] it’s a tree, they depict it as something that can be transplanted,
which makes it seem like no fundamental harm was done. Do you
understand? They say that the root of the tree is not necessarily connected
to this place but could instead be rooted anywhere else; they even say that
we can benefit from it. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 23, 2005]
However, apparently not all the olive trees have been transplanted. In December 2005,
popular Israeli daily Yediot Achronot printed a news story about an owner of a
contracting company who offered two undercover reporters one hundred large olive trees
for the price of $400 each. The reporters also found a 600-year-old olive tree on sale for
$8,000 in an Israeli tree nursery. It was insinuated that the Israeli Civil Administration
was somehow involved in these commercial activities (Yediot Achronot 2005).
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As a result of the public outcry triggered by these stories, Israel’s Minister of Defense
launched a public investigation into this issue (Telegraph 2002). Since then, Israel’s Civil
Administration in the West Bank has been devoting much care to replanting the trees
according to requests by their owners, or in temporary locations until the owners can
themselves replant them (see, e.g., Figure 7). The official website of Israel’s Ministry of
Defense states, accordingly, that
farmers who cultivate olive and other fruit trees growing within the
Security Fence can designate a new site to which the trees will be
relocated which has no free access constraints. Contractors assigned by
The [sic] Ministry of Defense to build the Security Fence are responsible
for carefully uprooting and replanting the trees. So far over 60,000 olive
trees have been relocated in accordance with this procedure. [Israeli
Ministry of Defense n.d.]
Attorney Suliman Shahin provides a different perspective about the aftermath of this
“olive scandal”:
Following the media exposure, the army now suggests to replant the
uprooted olive trees, but only if the Palestinian owner gives his consent.
Meanwhile, they plant the trees on state land until someone demands
something else. Or sometimes they uproot the trees but keep them in
place, watering the roots until the owners decide what to do. But in many
cases the owner can’t offer an alternative site, simply because he doesn’t
have one. What can he do, really? He can’t ask friends to plant the trees in
their land and cultivate it there – they would never agree! It’s very
complicated, and it’s all lip service on their part. [Interview, Jerusalem,
December 23, 2005]
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Figure 7. Uprooted olive trees, replanted in the margins of a state road near the city
of Qalqilia in the occupied West Bank. Photos by author, August 2006.

Olive Warfare: Uprooting by Settlers
In addition to the uprooting of Palestinian olives by the State of Israel, for the last decade
or so Jewish settlers have also been targeting Palestinian olive trees. Those mainly
responsible for this targeting are the New Settlers – a term that I use to distinguish the
more radical and largely messianic group of settlers, who live in distinct outposts
(declared by the State of Israel to be illegal), from the large majority of Jewish settlers
(see also Braverman 2008). The tree warfare conducted by the New Settlers adds another
layer of meaning to the relationship between humans and trees in the occupied West
Bank. Consider the following report:
According to the (incomplete) list of 29 incidents of agricultural sabotage
documented by the human rights groups Yesh Din and B’Tselem from
March to December, a total of 2,616 trees were sabotaged: uprooted,
20

stolen, burned, chopped, sawed. In Salem alone, 900 trees were uprooted
four times. [Ha’aretz 2006c]

Figure 8. Olive trees near Burin village damaged by settlers from nearby Yitzhar.
Yom Kippur, September 15, 2009. Photo courtesy of Yesh Din. Reprinted with
permission.

Some three years later, B’Tselem recorded this testimony from Ziad Sawan, a 53-yearold resident of Immatin (Qalqilia district) and father of ten:
I have a few plots of land that I inherited from my father. About six years
ago, settlers established Gilad Farm about two kilometers from one of my
plots. Since then, they have attacked farmers in the area and torched and
cut trees. Last spring, they set fire to orchards in the area, and the fire
spread to my land. As a result, I lost many olive trees and lots of money
during the harvest season. I filed a complaint, but nothing came of it. A
little while later, at the checkpoint, my permit to work in Israel was taken
from me, and now I’m unemployed. I think they took it because of the
complaint I filed. [Testimony (Jan. 21, 2009), B’Tselem n.d.b]
According to Rabbi Ascherman, the summer of 2008 has seen a dramatic incline in the
number of olive trees burnt, uprooted, and stolen by settlers – all part of Tag Mechir
(Operation Price Tag), launched by the New Settlers around that time in retaliation for
outpost evacuations (Telephone interview, December 23, 2008; see also Ha’aretz 2008b;
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McClatchy Newspapers 2008). According to Ascherman, since operation Price Tag
began, settlers have uprooted and set fire to thousands of olive trees. On June 2, 2009,
B’Tselem called on Israel’s Defense Minister to prepare for acts of violence by settlers
following Israel’s decision to evacuate outposts. B’Tselem also demanded that security
forces fulfill their obligation to allow Palestinian rescue and fire services freedom of
movement, or, alternatively, that they evacuate the injured and extinguish the fires.4
Conducted and articulated through the olive tree, the everyday land struggles between
Jewish settlers and Palestinians are also visible in the following instance. In December
2005, I observed the criminal trial of six young girls from several Jewish outposts near
Beit El, who were indicted for attacking Palestinian harvesters in the village of Sinjil,
north of Ramallah, and damaging their olive trees. According to the indictment, the six,
together with four other girls whom the Palestinian plaintiff could not identify, “began to
shove the farmers, hit them with sticks and throw stones at them.” When an Israeli soldier
tried to intervene, “the accused attacked him and beat him with their fists.” The girls were
also accused of pulling the headscarves off the women harvesters, punching one in the
face, and taking an elderly man’s walking stick and shoving him.
During a break in the court hearing I briefly spoke to one of the girls, who was fourteen
years of age at the time. When I asked her why she damaged the trees, the girl replied
confidently, “I have nothing against the trees; this is about the land – it’s our land, not
theirs.” The girls’ defense attorney, whom I interviewed separately both before and after
the court hearing, further suggested that the girls “are fair enough to give [the
Palestinians] a sort of early warning that now we are harming your trees, but next time
we will harm you.” Conflating humans and trees, the girls’ lawyer presented the
22

uprooting of trees as a humane act, an act that spares humans from the harsh treatment
that is, instead, inflicted on trees. The lawyer concluded the interview by asking me
rhetorically, “What do you think is more important, people or trees?”
Rabbi Arik Ascherman, executive director of Rabbis for Human Rights, interprets the
settlers’ act of uprooting very differently. Namely, he notes the conflation between
humans and the arboreal and the use of this conflation as a legitimizing factor for
damaging Palestinian trees. Rabbi Ascherman also tells me that many Jewish settlers
oppose the damaging of Palestinian trees. However, this opposition is usually based on
the sacredness of trees in Jewish tradition, rather than on the harm inflicted on the
Palestinian people. Indeed, secretary of Jewish settlement Maon, which is located in the
southern West Bank, has harshly condemned the uprooting of olive trees. “As settlers and
farmers,” a news statement quotes him saying, “our way is not to destroy and uproot, but
to build and plant” (Ha’aretz 2006b). Similarly, when replying to online questions on a
Jewish Orthodox website, Rabbi Zalman Melamed, the former head of Yesha Council of
Rabbis (the prominent settler organization), stresses that cutting olive trees is prohibited
by Jewish law, “unless the trees serve as hiding places for terrorists, and in that case they
should be cut down for security reasons” (Ha’aretz 2006b).
The reports about Jews harming olive trees elicited much shock among Jewish
communities around the globe. In an interview, a Toronto board member of the local
chapter of JNF explains some of the underlying reasons for his shocked response. “What
I am going to say is inhumane,” he warns me in advance, and then he proceeds to
illustrate in gory detail how he would “gladly” carpet-bomb a large crowd of “Arabs”
because “they all want to exterminate the Jewish people.” At the same time, he also
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expresses utter dismay that Jews would target what he calls “Arab trees.” In his words, “I
am ashamed that Jewish people can do this. They should go after the people, not after
their trees” (Interview, Toronto, June 13, 2005).
Public commentary in the online edition of the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz validates the
moral differentiation between humans and trees. These responses emphasize how
upsetting it is for Jewish people when “innocent trees” are targeted for uprooting,
especially by fellow Jews. Some comments even go so far as to compare this behavior
with that of the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan: “I can’t believe this,” says one North
American Jew, “we didn’t survive the Holocaust so we can do things like this!” A second
commentator argues that “cutting [olive trees] down is like the KKK burning crosses”
(Ha’aretz 2006a, 2006c).
Another response to the news about Jewish settlers intentionally damaging olive trees has
been outright denial. The common claim in this regard is that the Palestinians have been
imposing such damage on themselves. This claim has soon developed into a forensic
battle. According to Arutz-7, a right-wing Israeli newspaper,
Meanwhile, police forensics units have once again entered Samaria’s olive
groves to determine whether olive trees have been cut down by local
Jewish residents, as alleged by left-wing groups and the international
media, or by villagers seeking compensation…. Police investigators last
year found hundreds of trees that had allegedly been cut by Jewish
residents to have actually been pruned by their owners. [Arutz-7 2002].
And here, a different type of response to the olive uprooting phenomenon:
We must look severely upon the attacks on olive harvesters. For
Palestinian farmers, the olive harvest is a festival and a cultural event that
goes beyond the purely economic dimension. In the future, all necessary
steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. [Sharon,
B’Tselem 2002: 19]
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This statement was made by no less than Ariel Sharon, Israel’s then prime minister.
Similarly, in an unusual show of support, a task force of the Kibbutz Movement
accompanied Palestinian farmers to the harvest site with the explicit purpose of
facilitating their access to their agricultural lands and protecting them from settler
violence. The same task force, led by Yoel Marshak, also organized 10,000 volunteers to
help the farmers of the Gush Katif settlements in the Gaza Strip relocate their hothouses
to the Negev. “There are … those who come to help prevent hunger among the
Palestinians, and those who come for political reasons. I belong to the first group,” claims
Marshak (Ha’aretz 2006d, 2006e; also discussed in Telephone interview with Uri
Pinkerfield, member of this task force, August 20, 2006).
In contrast, international human rights activists seem less concerned by the physical and
economic damage caused by the uprootings and more by the emotional and symbolic
damages of these acts. In the words of human rights activist Christy Bischoff, “As we
approached the woman sitting by the 102 olive trees that the settlers cut the night before,
I saw the tears rolling down [her] face as she stared ahead. We were coming to pay our
respects; it was a funeral, a graveyard where the 30-year-old trees were slaughtered” (see
Amayreh 2006).
Other human rights groups provide different rationales for their support of Palestinian
farmers. For example, Rabbi Arik Ascherman of Rabbis for Human Rights has made it
very clear that his organization is not involved in this struggle for the sake of trees: “We
are not an environmental organization, and have no specific interest in trees, but rather in
the struggle over land” (Interview, Burin Village, Occupied West Bank, August 14,
2006). One of the central activities of Rabbis for Human Rights is the replanting of new
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olive trees in place of the uprooted ones. In certain years, activists of the organization
planted more than 25 thousand olive trees in place of those damaged or uprooted.
However, in December 2008 Ascherman informed me that the organization was only able
to raise enough money to plant 3,000 trees that year. Importantly, rather than replanting
according to the particular agricultural needs of the farmer or the village, Rabbis for
Human Rights requires that the Palestinians plant the trees donated by the organization in
the “right place.”
What is a “right place”? This was the focus of a conversation between Ascherman and
Nidal – the head of Burin’s Village Council – that I witnessed in Burin in August 2006.
Nidal asked for three hundred olive trees to replace the uprooted ones, to which
Ascherman replied by promising that he will get the new trees there by Sunday, “rain or
shine.” However, he qualified, “I will donate these trees with one condition: that they
don’t just serve farmers from the village, but that they are planted either in the areas that
are nearest to the settlements or in the [exact] location from which the trees were
uprooted, and not just anywhere.” This conforms with the mission of the organization,
which is not environmental, as Ascherman clarified above, but rather focused on the
unjust appropriation of Palestinian land. The olive trees, yet again, are fought over not for
their own sake but for what they have come to represent and embody.
In a later conversation conducted that same day, Rabbi Ascherman and two other heads
of Village Councils negotiated the number of trees that Rabbis for Human Rights would
provide for that particular season. During the conversation, the head of the Village
Council of Salem, where two thousand olive trees had been uprooted around that time,
revealed that he had already secured one thousand trees from two different sources. In
26

response, Ascherman clarified that “there is a long list of villages waiting for our trees; so
if you have trees from another source, I can give mine to other villages.” Evidently, even
the project of replanting olive trees involves multiple negotiations. Next, Ascherman
spoke with the head of Yanun’s Village Council, who refused to take any of Ascherman’s
trees. When he noticed my surprise at this, Ascherman explained, “Since their village is
near a very intense conflict zone they are not sure whether or not they will be able to
cultivate the land. They don’t want to plant trees and then not be able to take care of
them.” Here, then, the trees themselves again assume importance and not merely as tools
for grabbing land.
Another sensitive topic on the issue of trees has been the geographic source of these trees.
Ascherman assured me that the olive trees that Rabbis for Human Rights donates to
Palestinian villages are Israeli olive trees, “born and raised” in Jewish Israeli nurseries
only. He presents this as a type of distributive justice: the Palestinian olive trees, uprooted
by Jewish people, are now replaced by Jewish olive trees replanted by Palestinian people.
Despite the outcry in the international Jewish community over the uprooting of
Palestinian olive trees by Jewish settlers, and despite the wide embrace of Palestinian
farmers by numerous human rights groups and by Israel’s Kibbutz Movement, the
sabotage of olive trees is still an everyday occurrence in the West Bank. As a result,
Palestinian access to agricultural land is frequently jeopardized. Israel’s Attorney General
Menachem Mazuz acknowledged the gravity of these occurrences, stating that they are
“part of a wider phenomenon of a lack of law enforcement against Israelis in the
territories” and that “there’s a pervasive feeling of lawlessness [there]” (Ha’aretz 2006a).
For this reason, in 2006 Mazuz instructed the Israeli cabinet to compensate Palestinians
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whose olive trees were damaged by the settlers and declared that “[a]ll security and law
enforcement officials must devote themselves to a determined struggle against this grave
phenomenon, and those responsible must be caught and brought to trial” (Ha’aretz
2006a). Mazuz also ordered Israel’s security forces to increase their presence in those
areas where trees have been destroyed, to carry out a policy of quick and effective arrests,
and to compensate Palestinian tree owners.
Almost three years later, Ruthie Kedar, executive director of human rights organization
Yesh Din, informs me that the situation has steadily deteriorated rather than improved.
Israeli soldiers, she says, either don’t intervene in the face of settler harassment or join
in.5 For example,
On June 1, 2009 there was a big fire in the village of Burin. My colleague
and I got up and drove there to see if we could help with anything. When
we got there the settlers were standing in one corner of the road, and the
soldiers on the other side. The soldiers prevented the Palestinians from
using the fire engine that was standing there, and the fire just kept going
until it died down on its own. [Telephone interview, June 23, 2009]
Rabbi Ascherman is less explicit about the cooperation between the settlers and the
Israeli army:
I don’t think the army is officially cooperating with the settlers, … [but] it
is hard to know what their policy really is and what is the wink and nudge
kind of system where you turn a blind eye, and where low-rank soldiers
were doing something that is against the wishes of their commanders. All
three happen, and it is very hard to know which is happening in any given
situation. [Telephone interview, December 23, 2008]
HCJ 9593/04: “Friction Zones” and “Timetables”
According to a number of sources, Israel’s administration of Palestinian access to
agricultural lands was quite disorganized until 2002 (Interview, Limor Yehouda (attorney
for Association for Civil Rights in Israel), Jerusalem, December 20, 2005; Occupation
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Magazine n.d.). Before then, Rabbis for Human Rights worked both with Israel’s Defense
Forces and with the Israeli police to coordinate their assistance in cases of “harvest
trouble,” namely the interruption of Palestinian harvest by the New Settlers. Although
both agencies were more inclined to provide assistance when Jewish Israelis were
involved in any capacity, Rabbi Ascherman stated that it was also clear that “while Israel
Defense Forces defined their job as mainly to protect Israelis…, the police understood to
a much greater extent that their job was to protect the law and enforce it in all directions”
(Interview, Jerusalem, December 15, 2005).
In 2002, the rules of the game changed considerably. Instead of being granted protection
in direct response to their demands, the Palestinians became responsible for initiating
requests for protection through a rigid and complicated permit system. This coordination
process operated on the underlying assumption that Palestinian land cannot be protected
at all times with no regard to the cost. Rabbi Ascherman disagreed with this assumption,
stating that “Palestinians should be able to go to their land… without coordination, and
they should be able to sleep at night…knowing that someone is making sure that their
trees are not chopped down” (Interview, Jerusalem, December 15, 2005).
Rabbi Ascherman’s view was the foundation for the petition submitted by Rabbis for
Human Rights to Israel’s Supreme Court of Justice on behalf of Palestinian farmers,
focusing on the Nablus region and the area of Hebron. The Association for Civil Rights
in Israel (the Israeli equivalent of the ACLU) represented Rabbis for Human Rights in
this case. The petition framed the right of Palestinians to access their land as a
fundamental human rights issue, basing it on a property rights framework. Ascherman
adds in an interview, “As far as we’re concerned, if Palestinians want to go and have a
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picnic under their trees or to go and sit under their trees and look at clouds it’s their right.
And the army must be there to protect that right … 365 days a year” (Interview,
Jerusalem, December 15, 2005).
On June 26, 2006, Justices Dorit Beinisch, Eliezer Rivlin, and Salim Joubran of Israel’s
Supreme Court ruled that “a policy that prevents Palestinian residents from accessing
those lands that belonged to them in the name of their own defense is like a policy
forbidding someone from entering his home to protect him from a thief,” and that such
policy “is extremely unfair and represents a severe violation of basic rights through
giving in to [settler] violence and criminal acts” (HCJ 9593/04 Murar et al. v. IDF
Commander for Judea and Samaria, published 26/06/2006). The court thereby required
Israel’s Defense Forces to do everything in its power to support olive cultivation by
Palestinians. The following two subsections explore how such legal protection, despite
being well-intentioned, has merely furthered Israel’s spatial and temporal control over the
everyday life of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. This has happened through the
regulation of friction zones (space) and timetables (time) that pertain to trees.
Friction Zones (Ezorei Hikuch)
One of the outcomes of the new mandatory coordination system established in 2002 has
been a corresponding spatial vocabulary developed by Israel’s Defense Forces. A central
military term introduced in this context is ezorei hikuch (friction zones), which are
defined as zones where the army promises to protect the trees ad hazait haacharon (until
the last olive) (Interview, Rabbi Ascherman, Jerusalem, December 15, 2005; see also
Ha’aretz 2007a; Taayush 2004; Frish and Shmueli 2002). On maps drawn by Israel’s
Defense Forces, friction zones are depicted in red. Critics like the Israeli non profit
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organizations Rabbis for Human Right, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Yesh
Din, Gush Shalom, B’Tselem, Taayush and others have cast doubt on the benefits of the
friction zone system.
In response to pressure from the Supreme Court following the petition, Israel’s Defense
Forces revised the simple division of friction/nonfriction zones into a more complicated
system in which, according to Rabbi Ascherman, “the other part of the army’s statement
is that any place that is not defined as a friction zone they won’t bother to guard even if
asked.” He mentions that after “a number of attacks last year, I finally got them to realize
… that areas that they didn’t define at all as friction areas were actually [places] where
there could be a lot of problems. [Interview, December 23, 2008; see also Association for
Civil Rights n.d., Palestine News Network 2006, and Yoaz 2004]
Three years later, Ascherman informs me that the problems have changed somewhat.
Israel’s Defense Forces have been doing a much better job at protecting Palestinian
harvesters. At the same time, military commanders increasingly request that Palestinians
acquire permits for all areas, not only the red zone per the decision by the Supreme Court.
This, Ascherman concludes, is reason enough to go back to court (Interview, December
23, 2008). Either way, in the name of protecting the right of Palestinians to access olive
trees, and in the name of Palestinian tree protection in general, Israel’s Defense Forces
have thus revised their administration so that it further fragments this already fractured
space.6 Since the petition, then, the vernacular landscape has been reduced to an abstract,
two-dimensional series of blue, red, and yellow zones that have come to represent
regimented codes of mandatory spatial conduct (see also Braverman 2007).
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Timetables (Luzim)
The petition’s indirect result, namely the alienation Palestinians from their space, is
coupled with their alienation from local time. One example of this discrepancy between
local and military time regimes is provided by B’Tselem. While Israel’s Defense Forces
claim that olive groves require access only during the harvest season, B’Tselem notes that
this claim is inaccurate: “Cultivation of the orchards throughout the year, such as
plowing, pruning, and weeding, greatly affect the yield and quality of the olives and the
oil” (B’Tselem 2004).

Palestinians have also claimed that Israeli authorities were

consistently ignoring the type of crops they cultivate and underestimating the period of
time required for cultivation. In effect, Israel’s arbitrary timetables have been invalidating
the Palestinian’s vernacular sense of time.7 In other words, to manage the everyday tasks
that were once manageable without the mediation of military vocabulary, Palestinians are
now being forced to use the military’s timetable and the assistance of intermediary
organizations (see also Handel 2007).

Rabbi Ascherman also provides a small but illustrative example of one possible meaning
of local time in this context. When he asks the head of Burin’s Village Council by which
date the latter would like to have the trees ready for planting, the village head replies,
“After the big rain,” a schedule which the Rabbi contrasts with the military’s approach:
The Samaria branch of Israel’s Defense Forces has come up with a
timetable scheme, which means that they take responsibility for protecting
the harvesters, but only when the harvesters comply with certain time
requirements: for example, this and this village has [to harvest] from this
date to this date. [The military timetable] is mostly arbitrary: they make it
seem as if their timetable is coordinated with the Palestinians, but in fact
that doesn’t happen. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 15, 2005]
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Similarly, E.P. Thompson (1967) notes the modern transformation from agricultural time,
structured by seasons and associated with varied tasks, to “clock time,” which organizes
the working hours of industry to extract maximum surplus value from the workers. In
this case, Israel has introduced into the occupied West Bank a new system of timetables
(luzim) that impose a rigid allocation of harvest days.
So although Rabbis for Human Rights and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel won
the legal battle against the State of Israel, thereby forcing the Israeli military to protect
Palestinian access to and cultivation of land, the on-the-ground picture is much less
optimistic. Lawyer Yehouda, who took the case to court, describes some of the
underlying effects of the court’s decision:
You’re a farmer, and you want to go and cultivate your land, but now you
have to work through these overwhelming bureaucratic structures just to
go on living your daily life…. We’re talking about an entire bureaucratic
structure that has developed as a response [to the olive uprooting by the
settlers]. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 20, 2005]
Yehouda adds that the court decision “totally changed people’s lives over there. It
changed the nature of everyday life in the village” (emphasis added). Instead of
introducing stability and order, Israel’s bureaucratic apparatus has evoked much chaos
and misunderstanding, Yehouda says. “[Y]ou just can’t administer hundreds, or even
thousands, of farmers that, for the most part, don’t want to be administered,” she
concludes.
Conclusion
This article explored the legal geography – namely the interrelations between the
legalities and spatialities – of the olive tree. It did so, mainly, by discussing the olive’s
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physical, imaginary, and regulatory dimensions. In particular, the article showed that the
olive’s importance in the national Palestinian scheme, although definitely a result of
economic interests and historic tradition, is at the same time also given greater emphasis
by Israel’s deadly targeting of the olive tree as a symbolic and physical embodiment of
Palestinian national resistance. Simultaneously, the spatial and temporal regulation of
Palestinian conduct with regard to their olive groves has had a devastating effect on their
relationship to their land. Under the new separation regime, Palestinian access to
agricultural lands often requires a series of certificates, an ability to decipher countless
directives, and a comprehensive engagement with Israel’s military permit and gate
bureaucracy (see Abu-Zahra 2008; Braverman in press.c; Gordon 2008; Kelly 2006;
Weizman 2007). In effect, the Palestinian relationship to trees, and especially to the olive
tree, is now mediated and controlled through Israel’s detailed and often incomprehensible
military regulations. This effect is probably more acute and long lasting than even the
most extreme of olive uprooting practices carried out by the State of Israel or by the New
Settlers.
More generally, although both the New Settlers and the human rights activists
interviewed here have insisted that the Israeli/Palestinian war is not really about trees but
about land, it is nonetheless clear that the emotional, cultural, ritualistic, and economic
significance of the tree has been at the forefront of their actions. The Palestinian farmers
interviewed here would never have claimed that trees are unimportant in this battle.
However, they would probably also see clearly the connection between the trees and the
overall power struggle over land, autonomy, identity, and power at stake. Conducting the
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war over land through tree warfare – rather than simply taking over the land with the
force of guns and bulldozers, for example – has helped to fix and naturalize the
importance of trees in Israel/Palestine as well as to underscore the dramatic and central
role that land still performs in this region.

Notes
1. The quantitative data in this paragraph are from B’Tselem 2002, which quotes from the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestinian Agricultural Relief
Committee (PARC).
2. This is from an interview by B’Tselem, Case 2002, case 122, “Tapuah Settlers’ Abuse
of Palestinian Olive Pickers from Yasuf Village and Theft of Their Crop” (courtesy of
Nimrod Amzalek, B’Tselem). The B’Tselem website contains a number of interviews.
3. See B’Tselem n.d.a (statistics updated in 2007 and 2008) at
http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp, accessed June 23,
2009.
4. B’Tselem wrote an official letter to the authorities on this topic, which can be found at
http://www.btselem.org/english/Settler_Violence/20090604_settler_violence_following_
evacuation_of_outposts.asp, B’Tselem 2009. See also video recording of settlers setting
fire to Palestinian orchards in the Nablus area (B’Tselem 2009).
5. See also the article about the situation entitled “Ahead of the olive harvest 2007: Yesh
Din's demands from the security force, October 2007,” which can be found at
http://www.yesh-din.org/site/index.php?page=law3&lang=en.
6. The 1993 Oslo Accord divides Palestinian space into A, B, and C Areas. Areas A and
B of the occupied Palestinian territories are largely urban, and most of the agricultural
Palestinian land is situated in Area C, which is further divided into C1, C2, C3, and so
forth. For a critical account of Israel’s creative spatial design of the West Bank landscape
and its pervasive separation regime, see Weizman (2007) and Gordon (2008).
7. Another interesting dimension of a time-related struggle in this context actually
pertains to Palestinian “clock time.” Since “extra virgin” olive oil (which depends on the
oil’s low acidity and is the most desired oil in elite markets worldwide) depends on
timely production and shipping, the occupation’s general obstructions of movement have
also effectively obstructed Palestinians from realizing the market value of their olive oil
(Meneley 2008: 21). The economic aspects of olive cultivation in Israel (but not in the
occupied West Bank) are further discussed in the epilogue of Braverman 2009.

References Cited
Abu-Zahra, Nadia
2008 IDs and Territory: Population Control for Resource Appropriation. In War,

35

Citizenship Territory. Deborah Cohen and Emily Gilbert eds. Pp. 303–326.
New York: Routledge.
Amayreh, Khalid
2006 Israeli Army Uprooting Olive Groves. Al-Jazeera Online, January 12.
Cited
online
at
http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/art.php?aid=32260
and
http://forums.allaboutjazz.com/showthread.php?t=5423&page=141, accessed
October 17, 2009.
Arutz-7
2002 Yitzhar Resident Acquitted after Left-Wing/Arab Claims Rejected. January 2.
Ashrawi, Hanan Mikhail
1978 The Contemporary Palestinian Poets of Occupation. Journal of Palestine S
tudies 7(3): 77–101.
Association for Civil Rights
n.d.

Rights Leaflets to Palestinian Farmers.
Electronic document,
http://www.acri.org.il/eng/Story.aspx?id=616, accessed October 17, 2009.

Bardenstein, Carol B.
1998

Threads of Memory and Discourses of Rootedness: Of Trees, Oranges,
and the Prickly-Pear Cactus in Israel/ Palestine. Edebiyat 8(1): 1–36.

1999

Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Collective Memory. In
Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall and the Present. Mieke Bal, Jonathan
Crewe, and Leo Spitzer. eds. Pp. 148-168. Hanover, NH: University Press
of New England.

Blomley, Nicholas
1994

Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power. New York: Guilford Press.

Blomley, Nicholas, David Delaney and Richard Ford, eds.
2001

The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space. Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell.

Braverman, Irus
2007

Powers of Illegality: House Demolitions and Resistance in East
Jerusalem. Law and Social Inquiry 32(2): 333–372.

2008

The Tree is the Enemy Soldier: A Sociolegal Making of War
Landscapes in the Occupied West Bank. Law & Society Review 42(3):
449-482.

2009

Planted Flags: Trees, Land, and Law in Israel/Palestine. New York:
Cambridge University Press.

In press.a Planting the Promised Landscape. Natural Resources Journal.

36

In press.b Hidden in Plain View: Legal Geography from a Visual Perspective.
Journal of Law, Culture, and the Humanities.
In press.c Civilized Borders: A Study of Israel’s New Border Regime. Antipode:
A Radical Journal of Geography.
B’Tselem
2002

Report: Foreseen but not Prevented: The Israeli Law Enforcement
Authorities’ Handling of Settler Attacks on Olive Harvesters.
Electronic
document,
www.btselem.org/Download/200211_Olive_Harvest_Eng.pdf,
accessed October 17, 2009.

2004

Report: Not All it Seems: Preventing Palestinians Access to their Lands
West of the Separation Barrier in the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya Area. Electronic
document,
http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/summaries/200406_qalqiliya
_tulkarm_barrrier.asp, accessed October 17, 2009.

2009

Letter
to
the
Authorities.
Electronic
document,
http://www.btselem.org/english/Settler_Violence/20090604_settler_violen
ce_following_evacuation_of_outposts.asp, accessed June 22, 2009.

n.d.a

Statistics.
Electronic
document,
http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp,
accessed June 23, 2009.

n.d.b

Settlers attack Palestinian farmers on their land: Testimony. Electronic
document,http://www.btselem.org/English/Testimonies/20090110_Havat_
Gilad_Settlers_drive_farmers_off_their_land.asp, accessed June 23, 2009.

Callon, Michel
1986

Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the
Scallops and the Fisherman of St. Brieuc Bay. In Power, Action and
Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge. John Law ed. Pp. 196–233.
London: Routledge.

Cohen, Shaul Efraim
1993

The Politics of Planting: Israeli-Palestinian Competition for Control of
Land in the Jerusalem Periphery, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Delaney, David
1998

Race, Place, and the Law 1836–1948. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Farah, Najwa Qu’war
1992[1963] The Worst of Two Choices: or, The Forsaken Olive Trees. In
Anthology of Modern Palestinian Literature. Salma Khadra Jayyusi ed.

37

Pp. 434– 441. New York: Columbia University Press.
Frish, Felix, and Smadar Shmueli
2002

IDF and the Olive Harvest. Ynet, October 22,
at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2194216,00.html,
October 17, 2009.

accessed

Gordon, Neve
2008

Israel’s Occupation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gregory, Derek
2002

Deﬁled Cities. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 24(3): 307–326.

Gush Shalom
2004

The Harvest Coalition.
Electronic document, October 15, 2004,
http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/he/channels/press_releases/pr_pr15-102004, accessed October 17, 2009.

Ha’aretz
2006a

Mazuz Urges Compensation for Arabs Whose Olive Trees Axed. January
8.

2006b

Yesha: Some of the West Bank Olive Trees Felled by Palestinians.
January 10.

2006c

It’s Not the Olive Trees. January 11.

2006d

Witnesses Say Settlers Attacked Palestinian Farmers Near Nablus. April
1.

2006e

Salem: A Scene of Struggle between Settlers and Volunteers. April 17.

2006f

High Court Orders IDF to Protect Palestinian Farmers from Settlers. June
26.

2008a Border Control: In the Name of the Mother. October 10.
2008b Settlers Preparing for War, Says Shin-Bet Chief. November 3.
Handel, Ariel
2007

Controlling the Space through the Space: Uncertainty as a Technology
of Control. Theory and Criticism 31: 101–126.

Harlow, Barbara
1987

Resistance Literature. New York: Routledge.

Israeli Ministry of Defense

38

n.d.

Israel’s
Security
Fence.
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/questions.htm#q25,
accessed June 23, 2009.

Kanafani, Ghassan
1958

Men in the Sun, and Other Palestinian Stories. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.

Kelly, Tobias
2006

Documented Lives: Fear and the Uncertainties of Law during the
Second Palestinian Intifada. Royal Anthropological Institute 12: 89–
107.

Long, Joanna Claire
2005

(En)planting Israel: Jewish National Fund Forestry and the
Naturalisation of Zionism. MA Thesis, University of British Columbia.

McClatchy Newspapers
2008

Radical Jewish Settlers Threaten to Fight Israeli Army. December
3.

Meneley, Anne
2008

Time in a Bottle: The Uneasy Circulation of Palestinian Olive Oil. Middle
East Report 248: 18–23.

Nassar, Jamal Raji and Roger Heacock
1990

Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Publishing.

Occupation Magazine
n.d. No Peace Under the Olive Tree.
http://www.kibush.co.il/show_file.asp?num=282
October 17, 2009.

(Hebrew),

accessed

Palestine News Network
2006 Electronic
document.
October
1,
http://hebrew.pnn.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=144&It
emid=34 (Hebrew), accessed October 17, 2009.
Slyomovics, Susan
1998

The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Swedenburg, Ted
1990

The Palestinian Peasant as National Signi
ﬁer. Anthropological Quarterly
63(1): 18–30.

39

Taayush – Arab Jewish Partnership
2003

Olive
Harvest
2004.
Electronic
http://www.taayush.org/new/20041000-harvest.html#vulgar,

document,

accessed October 17, 2009.
Telegraph
2002

Palestinian Olive Trees Sold to Rich Israelis. November 28.

Thompson, E.P.
1967

Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism. Past and Present 38:
57-96.

van der Sluijs, Jeroen, van Eijndhoven, Josée, Shackley, Simon and Brian Wynne
1998

Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy. Social Studies of Science 28(2):
291–323.

Weizman, Eyal
2007

Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. New York: Verso.

Yediot Achronot
2005

West Bank Settlers Destroy Palestinian Olive Trees. December 19.

Yesh Din
2007 Ahead of the Olive Harvest 2007: Yesh Din's Demands from the Security
Force, October 2007. Electronic document,
http://www.yeshdin.org/site/index.php?page=law3〈=en, accessed June 24,
2009.
2008 Open Letter in Hebrew. Electronic document, September 11, 2008,
www.yesh-din.org/sys/.../YDOliveletter10Sep08Heb%5B1%5D.pdf,
accessed October 17, 2009.
Yoaz, Yuval
2004

The Supreme Court. Ha’aretz, November 2.

Zerubavel, Yael
1995

Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National
Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

40

